Able Danger Target: Jamie Gorelick

The revelation that a secret military intelligence group that culled public data in a way that identified the key 9/11 thugs damages the 9/11 Commission integrity. It supports earlier questions about a conflict of interest between Commissioner Gorelick and her previous role as a primary behind the Clinton policy of separation of intelligence and law in terrorism matters.

It also appears that the 9/11 Commission’s failure to report on its knowledge of Able Danger intelligence may be related to Democrat partisan’s efforts to minimize timelines showing any Atta-Iraq connection.

And then there is the Sandy Berger speculation about whether the document heist was related to Able Danger comments.

or there is this one from Betsy’s Page.

Other than pointing fingers at officials, there is an important reason why the Commission’s tailoring its report to fit its preconceived ideas matters. The Commission’s report was used as the basis for policy decisions on intelligence gathering. The Commission’s report is the sacred foundation for how we are going to approach intelligence from now on to prevent another 9/11. And, if there was information that was deliberately left out, for example, on Able Danger, then that would have had an effect. For example, Able Danger was based on data mining. And so was the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program which the Defense Department had to stop when there were all sorts of protests against fears of violations of privacy erupted. Perhaps, we would have paid more attention to the benefits of data mining if we’d known that that technique had actually identified some of the 9/11 terrorists a year before the terror attacks. And that was the job of the Commission – to present a nonbiased look at what went wrong and make recommendations, not to weed out uncomfortable information that didn’t fit their hypotheses.

Planning for the future on a flawed recollection of the past?

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